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United States Compliance with the
1967 GATT Antidumping Code
ROBERT E. HUDEC
The 1967 GATT Antidumping Code1 (hereinafter the
Code) may be viewed as an attempt to state an international consen-
sus about the correct policy and practice of national antidumping
laws. It is important to be clear about the nature of that consensus.
National antidumping laws are not an expression of accepted eco-
nomic theory about international trade.2 Rather, they tend to rest on
more pedestrian value judgments about things such as "fair competi-
tion." These underlying value judgments are not necessarily the
same from one country to another, and in some countries antidump-
ing laws are not even considered particularly useful or necessary. In
short, antidumping laws have neither a common base of accepted
economic theory nor a common foundation in other values. This sit-
uation means that efforts to negotiate an international consensus on
the subject necessarily involve a good deal of patchwork compromise
lacking a consistent underlying policy. Rather than finding common
ground, the negotiators must often settle for the middle ground-a bit
of one side and a bit of the other. The Code itself is such a document.
To illustrate the range of various national perspectives toward an-
tidumping laws, consider the following three positions. 3 First, and
somewhat paradoxically, the most rational economic welfare calcu-
lation with regard to dumping is probably that made by central plan-
ners in a state-controlled economy such as Poland. For these plan-
ners foreign trade represents an opportunity to maximize the yield of
national resources by importing when the cost of imports is less than
the cost of local production (costs being measured here in terms of
the opportunity cost of the resources used to obtain the goods in
question). Planners in pursuit of this goal have no reason to single
out dumped imports for special treatment. To be sure, planners will
be ready to restrain imports, i.e., not buy, when they feel that the
economic and social costs of displacing local production are too high.
In addition, they will pay attention to whether cheap imports are
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likely to be stable enough to justify whatever degree of local disin-
vestment is involved.4 In neither case, however, will the planner
care whether the imports are dumped. From the planner's point of
view, "the cheaper the better"; he will be quite happy, in fact, to find
long-term, marginal cost dumping. The central planner, in short, has
no reason to have an antidumping law, or its equivalent. 5
Given his disinterest in protecting his own economy against dump-
ing, in international negotiations the central planner is most likely to
ask for the narrowest possible scope of antidumping laws; the only
antidumping laws he cares about are foreign antidumping laws af-
fecting his own exports. The central planner is more than willing to
accept any and all restraints on his own antidumping law in return,
if he even has one.6 Concessions made to the central planner's point
of view represent concessions to plain and simple negativism.
Second, consider the position generally regarded as the other ex-
treme-the position represented by the United States antidumping
law. Viewed from the rational perspective of a central planner, the
antidumping laws of the United States make no more sense in max-
imizing United States economic welfare than they would for the Po-
lish economy. The motivation for the United States antidumping law
is not economic welfare, strictly speaking. Rather the United States
law reflects the view that dumping is an unfair trade practice.
The United States concept of unfairness in this context grows out
of the structure, and the ideology, of the United States private enter-
prise economy. Since investment resources are privately owned, it is
the private enterprise that bears the loss of investment when its do-
mestic production is displaced by foreign competition. It is the indi-
vidual workers who bear the major cost of employment displace-
ment. The ideology that justifies these private losses holds that those
who prevail in a competitive marketplace are the more efficient pro-
ducers, and therefore deserve the business they have taken because
of superior efficiency. This normative role assigned to superior effi-
ciency requires that there be a parallel normative condemnation of
those other forms of business practice which permit competitors to
gain market superiority without superior efficiency, i.e., the producer
who is able to reduce his prices because he receives a cash subsidy
from his government. Such competitive practices, unrelated to effi-
ciency, must be classified as unfair competition. Producers and
workers can be asked to bear the losses of fair competition only if
they are protected from unfair competition.
United States law treats dumping as an unfair competitive prac-
tice. The key assumption is that a dumping price represents a price
below average cost-in layman's terms, it is assumed that the ex-
porter could not stay in business if all his production were sold at
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that priceJ In the layman's view, such prices do not represent the
true efficiency of the export producer, and sales earned by selling at
those prices are thus unfairly obtained.
United States trade law places limits on fair foreign competition as
well as the unfair variety, but the distinction remains important.
Imports which are deemed fair (or are at least not shown to be un-
fair) may be limited only under escape clause remedies, which re-
quire proof of rather serious economic harm; moreover, these rem-
edies are designed to evaporate over time, in effect warning the
domestic producer that he must either improve his performance or
else get out of the business in favor of the more efficient foreign
producer. By contrast, United States foreign trade law creates an
entirely separate set of remedies for unfair trade which require a
significantly lower threshold of economic harm and which remain in
effect as long as the unfair practice exists. 8 Antidumping laws fall
into this second classification. In short, United States trade law not
only uses the pejorative epithet "unfair," but it takes this normative
message quite seriously.
A United States negotiator representing an antidumping policy
based on these value judgments will normally want authority to deal
effectively with this particularly unworthy type of competition. There
is bound to be little common ground between this perspective and the
negative views of those who see no need for antidumping laws at all.
Between the extremes of the Polish and the United States positions
is a rather large middle ground represented by economies stretching
from Japan to the European Community. Like the United States,
these are essentially private enterprise economies. Unlike the United
States, they appear to place less emphasis on the winner-take-all,
gamelike ideology of the United States marketplace. Instead, one
tends to find that both government and business in these economies
have a greater tendency to respond to competitive challenges by "ar-
rangements" that will satisfy all, or most, of the relevant partici-
pants-in pejorative terms, cartels. Under this type of business ide-
ology, dumping is hardly favored, but nonetheless it does not receive
quite the same moral condemnation. The trouble with dumping is
simply that aggressive price-cutting upsets order. The proper re-
sponse is simply to restore order-to search for a solution in which
the dumping exporter agrees to bring his prices back into line. The
solution is more likely to be determined by the prevailing order than
by any precise definitions of dumping.
This viewpoint presents yet a third attitude toward antidumping
laws. The ordering tradition involves a substantial amount of infor-
mal, consultative contact between government and the relevant do-
mestic and foreign producers. Depending on the legal traditions of
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the country involved, the foreign exporter (and his domestic im-
porter) may feel considerable compulsion to accept the practical solu-
tions suggested in such consultations, particularly when the alterna-
tive of litigating a defense to an antidumping complaint is expensive,
uncertain, or simply not done. In a setting where such "administra-
tive guidance" is practiced, the precise substantive rules of the anti-
dumping law will not be overly important. The existence of an anti-
dumping law may be a useful calling card on price-cutting exporters,
but what happens after that will be settled informally.
It is difficult to generalize about the precise negotiating position
dictated by this third view. To the extent the particular country can
achieve its objectives informally, its negotiators should be willing to
accept rather stringent limitations on their own antidumping law in
order to limit the antidumping laws of other governments which af-
fect their own exporters. To this extent, this third position will be like
that of the Polish position, essentially negative.
The hypothetical Polish position is interesting primarily as a refer-
ence point. The major contending forces in the drafting of the 1967
Code were the latter two positions described-the moralistic position
reflected by United States law, and the more exporter-oriented posi-
tion defined by the Japan-to-European Community spectrum. Two
summary points should be made about this latter clash of views.
First, despite the apparently similar economic structures of the par-
ticipants, there is potentially a very large gap between the underly-
ing premises about antidumping law. Both the text of the Code, its
subsequent administration, and even its possible renegotiation in
the future, are very likely to show the effects of this lack of a com-
mon starting point. This position may often represent what is in fact
a more protectionist trade policy. Although undoubtedly some voices
for the soft-line represent genuine liberal trade policy, especially
among the traditionally free-trading small nations of Western Eu-
rope, some of the larger voices for the soft-line have pressed that
view for exactly the contrary reason-that is, because they have
such thorough-going systems of trade regimentation that dumping
rules are partially or wholly irrelevant to their own level of trade
protection. 9
As a consequence, it is wrong to draw too many conclusions from a
study of adherence to the Antidumping Code. For example, one may
predict that Poland will never violate the Code. This will not mean
that Poland has a free market. Along the same lines, although the
European Community and others have adopted internal antidumping
laws which are an essentially verbatim copy of the Code, 10 the inter-
nal administration of those laws should be examined before jumping
to the conclusion that meaningful compliance has in fact occurred.
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STANDARDS OF COMPLIANCE
The United States' defense to charges that it has not complied with
the Antidumping Code involves a distinction between two levels of
compliance: formal law, the stated legal criteria which a govern-
ment claims to apply; and operating law, the actual facts on which
affirmative decisions are made, measured against the formal criteria
of the Code. The United States contends that, while there may be
differences or inconsistencies at the level of formal law, its operating
law has conformed to the requirements of the Code. The United
States argues that compliance at this level is sufficient-that to
prove a violation, one must point to specific cases which, on their
facts, do not satisfy the Code standards."'
One can argue that the United States position sets impossible crite-
ria, or at least unduly difficult criteria, for measuring compliance.
Almost any set of economic facts can be arranged into a colorable
defense-one which will allow a United States spokesman to answer
a complaint without embarassment. In international confrontations
between governments, such factual defenses will usually suffice to
blunt the first round of complaints. The only way to penetrate this
line of defense is by a careful, neutral examination of the facts-in
effect, third-party adjudication. Unfortunately, the international
machinery established to monitor the Code has never developed a
tradition of such adjudication. 12 Consequently, the operating law
standard makes it possible for the United States to block any formal
international judgment of United States practice.
There is, of course, the court of independent scholarly criticism,
but critics do not find an easy road to judgment either. Written deci-
sions by United States officials are often terse and difficult to follow,
and the complete facts are very often unavailable due to confidential-
ity requirements or inadequate publication. Administrators thus
have the enviable position of owning more information than their
critics, a situation which always makes critics somewhat hesitant.
Difficult as it makes things, the United States claim to be judged
by operating law compliance was in some sense part of the original
bargain behind the Code. When the United States acceded to the
Code in 1967, it announced that it intended to achieve compliance
without changing existing legislation, a decision based on the judg-
ment that proposals for new antidumping legislation might open the
door to protectionist amendments that would make the antidumping
law more rather than less restrictive. It was believed that the exist-
ing United States antidumping law would permit officials to achieve
operating law compliance by means of administrative interpretation
of the rather broad language of the existing United States statute.13
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Although the United States obtained no formal recognition of this
intention, all the participants knew these intentions fully, for United
States law and practice were without doubt the chief target of the
Code negotiations.
The credibility of United States efforts to prove compliance under
the operating law standard has been impaired by a series of legal
reverses which followed adoption of the Code. Soon after the Code
was adopted, a 3 to 2 majority of the Tariff Commission (now the
International Trade Commission) issued a report pronouncing many
of the Code's injury standards inconsistent with Tariff Commission
interpretations of the injury standard of the United States antidump-
ing law. 14 The Congress followed with legislation that ordered the
Commission and the Administration to adhere to United States law
in cases of conflict with the Code. 15 The later revision of the anti-
dumping law in the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter the 1974 Act)
conspicuously failed to call for adherence to the Code. A few amend-
ments did permit closer compliance with Code requirements, but
Congress never mentioned the Code itself and went out of its way to
affirm certain other practices which appear to be inconsistent with
compliance. The Congress also made clear that it expected vigorous
prosecution of antidumping complaints, and subsequent oversight by
congressional committees has made it clear that the Congress means
to keep a careful watch on the manner in which United States offi-
cials exercise their interpretative and discretionary powers under the
United States law.
16
The operating law standard of compliance has proved to be both
awkward as a matter of principle and difficult to make credible in
practice. The very domestic policy attitudes which make it necessary
to resort to such a standard have worked to undermine the credibility
needed to accept the essentially unverifiable judgments that must be
made under it. It is thus difficult to contemplate any long-term solu-
tion to the compliance issue that does not include formal compliance
as well. Although one must be quick to add that formal compliance
will be no guarantee of operating law compliance (the United States
position has no doubt rendered a service in directing attention to this
issue), a credible claim of compliance must begin with a domestic
law that conforms to the principles of the Code.
This article examines the present gap which exists between the Code
and United States law. The main section which follows attempts to
set out the major disparities in formal law. It attempts at the same
time to assess the nature of operating law compliance to the extent
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possible. A brief concluding section examines the outlook for greater
future congruence between United States law and the Code.
17
CODE RULES AND UNITED STATES LAW
The Antidumping Code is not a paragon of precision or clarity. Its
language may be read to raise many points of possible conflict with
United States law. The following survey attempts to identify the
main points of possible conflict-those that have been made issues
by other governments, and those which probably would be made
issues in a further negotiation.
Initiation of Investigations
The Code places considerable emphasis on the criteria for opening a
formal investigation and attempts to stop cases which are sure losers
at the outset. This is a concern of considerable importance, for the
mere fact of a formal investigation will often create enough commer-
cial concern about potential liability to act as a powerful deterrent to
trade."' Rules which merely assure a proper outcome at the end of an
investigation will do little to cure these trade-restricting effects.
Code Article 5:1 states that complaints "shall normally be initiated
upon a request on behalf of the industry affected [emphasis added]."
A footnote states that the term "industry" is to be defined as the
producers of the major proportion of national output of the like prod-
uct, excluding producers who import the allegedly dumped goods. 19
Read together, the sections appear to say that, in normal circum-
stances, the government should not entertain complaints from weak-
sister firms alone if the largest share of the industry does not want to
be bothered. Likewise, if the word "producers" is read strictly, labor's
complaints should not be heard if management does not join them.
United States law contains no similar requirement of industry initi-
ation. Not only may the Treasury Department open an investigation
sua sponte, but virtually anyone may request that such an investiga-
tion be initiated. As a practical matter, however, both a heavy work-
load and the diplomatic sensitivity of antidumping. complaints tend
to deter Treasury-initiated complaints when there is not strong in-
dustry interest in complaining. In addition, nonrepresentative com-
plaints may be excluded at the outset if they fail to show any injury.
20
Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that there will be substantial
compliance at the operating law level. The main legal issue will be
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whether the few serious cases filed by nonrepresentative parties can
be rationalized under the "special circumstances" exception of Arti-
cle 5, or whether the concept of "industry" can be bent enough to fit
the actual complainants.
21
A complaint charging dumping of automobiles, filed by the United
Auto Workers and a Congressman, but not management, is a case in
point.2 2 Several governments argued vigorously that acceptance of
the complaint was a violation of the Code Article 5. Although the
Code does list employment as one factor to be considered in deter-
mining injury, the complaining governments did not agree that labor
interests could represent the industry. The United States also offered
what could be viewed as a "special circumstances" justification.
Pointing out that the automobile producers had extensive interna-
tional operations, including large imports to the United States, the
United States argued that because the foreign interests of the domes-
tic manufacturers might be adversely affected, directly or indirectly,
by their participation in the complaint, they were not capable of rep-
resenting the domestic industry interests involved. Other govern-
ments disagreed. 23 Their contrary interpretation read the Code to say
that multinational corporations should be allowed to judge their own
injury from the multinational perspective in which they operate, and
that the interests of the producers should prevail where they con-
flicted with worker interests.
The charge of legal violation appears difficult to sustain. The
industry-complaint rule is qualified by the term "normally," a term
sprinkled through the Code at various points in what appears to be
an effort to qualify obligations that the United States could not prom-
ise to obey fully.2 4 There is also the undefined exception for special
circumstances, under which a prima facie legal defense should be
available for any factor out of the ordinary.
25
The dispute over this issue provides a good illustration of the basic
policy differences affecting the present Code, and of how they have
been compromised in that text. The United States requirement that
preliminary investigations must be initiated whenever the responsi-
ble official receives information of actionable dumping, and that
Customs officials must report such information if it should come to
their attention, reflects a view of dumping as a kind of public
wrong-a wrong that public officials have a duty to prosecute
whether anyone complains or not. This is, of course, a logical exten-
sion of the unfairness motif. The Code's provision that the complaint
be initiated by the majority of producers, by comparison, looks like a
conception of private wrong. This second view of antidumping law is
compatible with the more arrangement-oriented view discussed ear-
lier.26 This clash between the public and private conceptions of
dumping can be found in many of the apparent divergences between
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United States law and the Code. The present Code's answer bears
noting. The Code states one viewpoint as a rule, and then qualifies
the statement so that it is no longer actually binding. Policy differ-
ences have been compromised, but not reconciled.
A second Code requirement for the initiation of formal investiga-
tions is that private and government-initiated complaints must be
supported by "evidence ... of injury." 27 This presumes that a pre-
liminary determination will be made about evidence of injury before
a formal proceeding is opened. The following subsections of Article 5
go on to state that, assuming this first hurdle is cleared with satisfac-
tory evidence, the injury issue should be investigated more or less
simultaneously with the question of dumping, and that the investiga-
tion must be terminated promptly whenever officials become satis-
fied that the evidence of injury is inadequate.
In 1967, United States law was very difficult to manipulate into
conformity with this requirement, and for years the United States
claim of compliance rested on a terribly convoluted Treasury Depart-
ment procedure which probably satisfied neither the Code nor United
States law.28 The 1974 Act amended the United States antidumping
laws to bring United States practice closer to the spirit of Article 5 in
this regard. The 1974 Act confirmed the Treasury practice of requir-
ing injury data in the complaint and expressly authorized Treasury
to screen such data during a thirty-day period after the complaint.
2 9
The Act then provided that, where Treasury finds "substantial
doubt" of injury, the case may be referred to the ITC for a quick
thirty-day investigation and determination as to whether there is "no
reasonable indication" of requisite injury. If the ITC makes such a
finding, the case is dropped. 30 If not, the case is returned to Treasury
for a six-month investigation of the dumping issue, with no further
consideration of the injury issue until Treasury has made a final
determination of dumping. Thereafter, the ITC makes a three-month
investigation of the injury issue, during which time Treasury retains
the power to consider possible errors in its dumping determination
and to modify or reverse its dumping finding before the ITC issues
findings.31
The new "thirty-day wonder" proceeding before the ITC appears to
satisfy all the procedural requirements for review prior to opening an
investigation. Governments have charged, however, that the statu-
tory standard for termination at this point ("no reasonable indication
of injury") is too stringent.32 The main objection is that the United
States statute, as interpreted by the ITC, places the burden on the
party seeking dismissal.33 Article 5 of the Code, requiring that the
complaint be "supported by evidence.., of injury," arguably places
the burden on the complainant. Perhaps more to the point, the spirit
of Article 5 seems to call for something more than an inability to
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show there is no reasonable indication of injury as a justification for
the damage to trade of a six-month investigation.
This dispute over the exact meaning of the preinvestigation stan-
dard would probably not be very significant if the formal investiga-
tion which followed could dispose of weak injury cases immediately.
The dispute is important, however, because, under the United States
procedure, a weak injury case which survives the thirty-day wonder
inquiry must await a six-month investigation of the dumping issue
before the issue of injury can be considered again. Curiously, Article
5 permits this disjointed sequence. Article 5(b) states that dumping
and injury "should" be considered simultaneously throughout the
investigation, but it only requires that simultaneous consideration
"shall" be given after provisional remedies can be invoked. The
United States meets this requirement by not invoking provisional
remedies (withholding of appraisement) until after the six-month
dumping investigation. Consequently, only after the six-month inves-
tigation must the two issues be considered simultaneously. Although
the dumping issue is generally all but settled by then, Treasury's
reservation of power to reconsider the dumping finding during the
ITC investigation constitutes technical compliance with the by now
meaningless simultaneous consideration requirement.
34
The proponents of Article 5 probably wanted something more simul-
taneous than this. Quite clearly, however, they did not get their way.
The United States could not promise abandonment of its totally sepa-
rate injury proceeding; at best, it could promise only to delay provi-
sional remedies until the injury determination could be launched.
Faced with this unsatisfying bargain, the proponents might have been
expected to recognize the critical importance of the initial preinvesti-
gation standard in Article 5(a), and to have included something a little
more forceful than "supported by evidence of." Alas, here again the
United States negotiators were not able to promise more, for in 1967
the Treasury Department had only a tenuous claim of authority to
make any review of the injury issue at all. The current effort to make
something more out of the "supported-by-evidence" standard, by ap-
pealing to the purpose of Article 5, has the ring of renegotiation to it.
Given the debatable status of formal law compliance, one might
ask how well the United States procedure complies with the spirit of
Article 5 as operating law. How well, in fact, does the United States
procedure screen out cases in which the injury issue should have
ended the case quickly? A few numbers may give a flavor of how the
procedure has operated.
As of November, 1978, there had been twenty-two complaints re-
ferred to the ITC under this thirty-day procedure; six (27 percent)
had been terminated for inadequate evidence of injury. 35 Of the six-
teen cases allowed to go forward, only three had progressed to the
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stage of a final injury determination. Two produced a unanimous
finding of no injury;36 the third resulted in a 3 to 2 finding of likeli-
hood of injury.
37
A certain amount of nonsense has been spoken about the cases
sent forward for investigation. Critics in GATT have argued that
Treasury's decision to refer a case to the ITC (based on a finding of
substantial doubt) is tantamount to an official admission that the
case should have been dismissed. 38 By that logic, any effort to raise
the injury issue ends up conceding that it is valid. The United States,
on the other hand, appears to see some virtue in the fact that not one,
but two, United States agencies look into the injury question at this
time. Since it takes only one agency's decision to send the case for-
ward it is difficult to follow the argument that more is better.3 9
Another possible test of the adequacy of the thirty-day wonder
procedure is to ask what proportion of cases are thrown out in the
final injury investigation. Arguably, a high proportion of failures at
this final stage would indicate that the initial screen is letting too
many bad cases through. Some would argue that a high proportion of
affirmative findings would demonstrate protectionist sentiments on
the Commission, 40 but then it is impossible to please everyone. Of the
twenty-four ITC decisions in cases subject to the 1974 Act, there
have been eleven affirmative findings (46 percent).41 The 46 percent
ratio of affirmative findings is actually lower than the 53 percent
ratio from 1967-75, the post-Code period when there was no thirty-
day procedure, 42 though the difference is not statistically significant.
The ratio is higher than the ratio for the years prior to 1967, where
the ratio was only 22 percent.43 The erratic movement of the ratio
suggests either (1) that the new screening procedure has had no
measurable effect, or (2) that too many other economic and political




The provisions of Code Article 2 elaborating the price-discrimination
concept of dumping are rather brief, and for the most part they add
nothing but common sense expansion to the few sentences in GATT
Article VI on this subject. Most of the issues that governments com-
plain about in this area are not really covered by Article 2.
Perhaps the most fertile area for debate has been the question of
identifying differences between the terms-and-conditions of home
market sales and export sales that can be used to justify a lower
price for export. Both Article VI of GATT and Article 2 of the Code
require that "due allowance shall be made for the differences...
affecting price comparability." Issues naturally vary with the precise
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business situation in each case. Critics of United States practice
commonly object to proof requirements for what are claimed to be
intuitively obvious cost differences. A related theme of criticism is
the alleged United States failure to recognize commercial practice as
a justification for accepting certain factors as legitimate bases of
price differentials. 45 In the usual setting, a lawyer argues "commer-
cial practice" when there is no cost justification.
At bottom, most of these proof-and-practices issues boil down to the
government's desire or ability to give the benefit of the doubt to ex-
porters whose prices initially indicate dumping. In a small way, per-
haps, this is yet another reflection of the gaps created by differing
conceptions of the wrong at issue. The greater the perceived wrong
at issue, the greater the political pressure on officials to prove calcu-
lations which excuse the prima facie case.
A second issue that has generated considerable debate recently is
the concept of constructed value, a cost-plus-profit-plus-overhead
calculation that is authorized when home market prices are unavail-
able or unreliable.46 The Code states that, "as a general rule," the
allowance for profit should not exceed the rate of profit "normally
realized on sales of products of the same general category in the
domestic market of the country of origin. '47 The United States legis-
lation requires that the profit margin be no less than 8 percent.48 The
1967 Executive branch analysis of the Code explained that a profit
allowance of 8 percent (which normally means 4 percent after taxes)
would meet the Code test in most cases, and that the few cases
where 8 percent is higher than the relevant industry's recent profits
would fit within the exception implied by "as a general rule. ' 49 This
argument has met growing objection in the recent era of business
stagnation, on the ground that 8 percent is simply not "normal."
A third current issue, potentially the most important, involves an
innovation of the 1974 Trade Act, providing that otherwise accept-
able home market prices cannot be used for price comparison if they
represent sustained sales at a loss. 50 In other words, even though the
export price is the same as the regular domestic price, dumping may
be found if the uniform price does not cover costs of production. The
new rule creates particular problems for capital-intensive industries
such as steelmaking which may be forced to sell at a loss during
extended periods of slack demand.
The text of the Code does not clearly prohibit this new rule. The
pertinent provision authorizes the rejection of a home market price
when "because of the particular market situation, such [home
market] sales do not permit a proper comparison." 51 The reference to
"proper comparison" simply begs the question.
The cost-of-production exception is probably consistent with the
basic normative objection to dumping on the part of businesspersons
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and politicians, at least in the United States. The premise is that
dumping prices are not prices at which the exporter could stay in
business if he had to sell all his output at that price. The new cost-of-
production rule merely elevates the premise to the status of a rule.
The difficulties with making the premise explicit are several. The
exporter's cooperation with such cost-of-production investigations
can be very expensive, perhaps enough to make harassment profit-
able. The accounting decisions needed to determine cost could open
the process to considerably more arbitrariness than is now the case.
Worst of all, logical extension of the theory could expose the fact that
we do not really know what we mean by cost. What do we do when a
production facility operating at a loss is sold to someone else at an
appropriately lower price? Or, what do we do when we find that the
producer is covering its costs, but that the free market price of inputs
is below their cost? The difficulties presented by the issue would
appear to be beyond the capacity of government procedures.
Material Injury
Articles 3 and 4 of the Code deal with the definition of the injury
standard. The key concept of material injury, which forms the basis
for liability, is not defined. Important statements are made about
causation and about the definition of the relevant industry.
Material
There are two general positions on the meaning of "material." The
first is that the term "material" means any economic harm more
than trivial, inconsequential, de minimis economic harm. The sec-
ond is that "material injury" means a higher threshold, something
not quite as hurtful as the "serious injury" required for ordinary es-
cape clause relief, but yet still serious in the ordinary sense of that
word. There seems to be increasing agreement among the govern-
ment signatories of the Code that the text of the Code fails to define
that higher threshold, and that without such a definition, the Code
fails to create a cognizable legal commitment to that higher stan-
dard. While particular cases continue to be debated, charges of for-
mal noncompliance cannot be pressed very far.
However, there does appear to be a consensus, among the majority
of signatories at least, that the spirit of GATT Article VI and the Code
requires the higher threshold. At the level of formal law, the United
States does not satisfy this demand. The United States statute refers
merely to "injury. ' '52 In years past the ITC (previously the Tariff
Commission) took the position that the term "'injury" in the United
States Antidumping Act meant the same thing as "material injury"
under GATT Article VI, implying that something more than a de
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minimis threshold was involved.53 Nonetheless, more recent opin-
ions have indicated that, whether or not the word "material" is
added, the standard is the de minimis threshold.5 In what might be
called a gratuitous but highly authoritative legislative dictum, the
Senate Finance Committee affirmed the latter view in its Report on
the 1974 Act:
Obviously, the law will not recognize trifling, immaterial, insig-
nificant or inconsequential injury. Immaterial injury connotes
spiritual injury, which may exist inside of persons not indus-
tries. Injury must be a harm which is more than frivolous, in-
consequential, insignificant or immaterial. 55
Whether the battle of words and thresholds has any meaning in
terms of results in specific cases has yet to be shown. What is needed
is some definition of the higher threshold that can be applied and an
application of that threshold to the facts of ITC injury findings. At
the present time, there is no satisfactory way to test the assertion
that, as a matter of operating law, the affirmative decisions of the
ITC meet this higher standard.
The possibility that GATT governments might one day negotiate an
operative definition of material injury calls for an additional observa-
tion. The standard of injury is the one place, above all others, where
one can expect differences of basic policy to surface. If dumping is
really something bad and unfair, it will follow that it should be at-
tacked wherever the economic harm is large enough to warrant the
cost of doing so. The formal expressions that constitute United States
domestic law seem to begin from this value premise. Formal adop-
tion of some higher threshold would appear to be unattainable with-
out some way of changing or avoiding this basic policy attitude.
Causation
There is a rather direct conflict between the Code rules on causa-
tion and the parallel concepts in United States law-at least at the
formal level. The Code's concept of injury appears to rest on a mea-
surement of what might be called "overall injury"-the current eco-
nomic position of the industry (profits, capacity utilization, employ-
ment, etc.) measured against some standard of economic good
health, be it either past performance or some general standard of
successful operation, or both. If the current state of the industry is
below this standard of good health, this difference is the injury being
suffered, and if the difference is great enough, it is material injury.
The Code requires governments to identify the causes of that overall
injury, which may range from dumping to slack demand, interprod-
uct competition, and the like. The Code then states that, in order to
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impose antidumping remedies, governments must find that dumping
is the "principal cause" of material injury.56 The Code does not state
flatly that principal means a cause larger than all the other causes
combined, but that is the thrust of its various subsidiary provisions.
57
The United States statute provides simply that the ITC must find
that an industry has been "injured by reason of [the dumped im-
ports]." 58 In its Report on the 1974 Act cited above, the Senate Fi-
nance Committee expressed the view that injury due to other causes
was immaterial to the injury test under United States law.59 Neither
the Finance Committee's commentary nor subsequent ITC decisions
claiming to adhere to it are completely clear on the causation test that
follows from this view. Part of the time it appears that the test re-
quires isolating the economic harm caused by the dumping and find-
ing injury where that particular quantum of harm is more than imma-
terial. The more common view suggests that the ITC should look at
the overall injury, measure the causative influence of dumping on
that overall injury, and determine whether dumping has enough cau-
sal significance to be called a cause of this larger condition. 60 Neither
of these conceptions approaches the Code's "principal cause" test.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Code's concep-
tual approach actually does have a counterpart in other United
States trade law. The United States escape clause legislation has
always viewed injury as an overall concept, and has required that
imports be either a "major cause" (the 1962 law) or a "substantial
cause" (the 1974 law) of that overall injury before import relief can
be granted.6 1 The causal requirement in the United States escape
clause law is pretty clearly a normative statement-that domestic
industry is not deserving of relief from import competition if most of
its troubles are due to factors other than import competition, i.e., its
own competitive inadequacy or general business conditions. The
Code approach, in effect, asks that the same normative judgment be
made about relief from competition from dumped imports. The differ-
ent causation test in United States antidumping law simply rejects
that normative claim. The obvious distinction is that the import com-
petition dealt with under the escape clause is presumably fair compe-
tition, whereas dumping is not.
62
Industry
A third major issue under the injury concept is the definition of the
industry that is entitled to complain if injured. The Code begins with
the proposition that "industry" must normally encompass the entire
national production of the relevant product.0 The United States law
begins from the same premise.r There are some differences of lan-
guage relating to the definition of the relevant products, 65 but the
practical consequence of these differences appears minimal.
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The most talked about issue in this area is the concept of regional
industry. Under Code Article 4(a) (ii), the normal rule that requires
consideration of the entire national production of a product may be
set aside where producers in certain regional markets are isolated
from other markets, both in terms of their own sales and sales from
the producers in other markets. The producers in such an isolated
regional market may be considered an industry for purposes of
weighing injury.
Under the United States antidumping laws, both the former Tariff
Commission and the present ITC have occasionally employed a re-
gional industry concept. When Congress reviewed the Code shortly
after ratification, a 3 to 2 majority of the Tariff Commission reported
that the Code rules on regional industries were more restrictive than
those followed by the Tariff Commission, and that four out of five
recent findings of injury to a regional industry under United States
law might have been decided differently under the Code rule. The
main difference, according to the Commission majority, was that the
Code rule required virtual isolation of the market, whereas the Com-
mission had employed less rigorous tests of market separateness.
66
A few leading pre-Code decisions were clearly inconsistent with
the Code test. Commission decisions since adoption of the Code have
done nothing to suggest a fundamental change of heart. The few
post-Code cases are badly muddled by a doctrine which, after looking
at injury in a particular region alone, purports to find injury to the
total national industry, on the theory that "injury to a part [not neces-
sarily a regional industry-just a "part"] is injury to the whole.
67
Few would defend these cases as complying with any Code standard;
the best defense would be that the part-whole doctrine is dead.
The Commission has managed to avoid the issue in recent years,
not having based any affirmative decisions on the regional industry
concept. 68 However, this issue could become the source of a major
compliance controversy, because, unlike most of the provisions
which challenge United States practice, the Code criteria defining
regional industries are quite precise. The possibility of clear viola-
tions by the United States is substantial.
Remedies
United States law clearly violates one Code rule on remedies. Code
Article 11(i) provides that where dumping duties are based on a find-
ing of likelihood of injury (no injury yet, but likely if relief is not
granted), the duties may be imposed only upon goods entered after
such decision. By contrast, where present injury is found, the Code
permits application of dumping duties to all imports that have en-
tered while provisional remedies were in effect-usually about three
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months prior to the final findings. United States law does not make
this distinction. In a recent case involving likelihood of injury, Trea-
sury sought to follow the Code rule, but this was found to be in
violation of United States law, and the Secretary was ordered to im-
pose dumping duties on such entries.
69
United States law comes very close to violating a second remedy-
limiting rule; Code Article 8(e) provides that, in a case where the
only injury is to a regional industry, dumping duties may be levied
only on imports destined for that region. United States negotiators
feared that the Constitutional requirement of uniform customs treat-
ment would prohibit such selective application, a fear that was par-
tially confirmed by recent court decision involving a 1963 (pre-Code)
dumping finding.70 To reconcile the Code with United States prac-
tice, the United States negotiators secured the addition of a bizarre
exception to Article 3(e) which allows application of nationwide
duties in such cases if the exporter refuses to give an assurance that
it will "cease dumping in the area concerned." United States nego-
tiators believed that compliance could be achieved by demanding
such a price assurance in all regional industry cases. 7
1
Another area of considerable concern at present is the timing of
rescission of antidumping remedies. What happens after a finding
occurs, and how long must it go on? The Code adopts a predictably
antipunitive stance, requiring that remedies be dismantled as soon
as they are no longer "necessary" to counteract injurious dumping.
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In contrast, Treasury regulations provide that, ordinarily, a finding
of sales at less than fair value (dumping) will be revoked only after a
two-year history of no dumping. 73 Although no dumping duty is im-
posed on nondumped imports during this period, all entries must be
investigated.
Several countries have complained that the presumptive two-year
minimum is punitive, and thus violates the Code rule.74 The legal
issue would appear to be whether Treasury's rule of thumb is an
acceptable means of proving that future dumping is unlikely so that
the duties are no longer necessary to forestall it. Also at issue is
whether a punitive purpose (to deter others who might be tempted to
take a more or less free bite) is a legitimate gloss on a rule limiting
duties to those which are necessary to counteract dumping which is
causing injury.
THE OUTLOOK
Through 1978, it appeared unlikely that the United States could
achieve conformity with the Antidumping Code by renegotiating the
Code itself. From the point of view of most other governments,
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formal adherence to the present text of the Code was the only
choice open to the United States. The United States has signed the
Code. Most of the other governments had brought their laws into
conformity (many by adopting the Code text itself). The United
States had precious little standing to ask for reconsideration after
everyone else had complied.
That judgment now appears to have been premature. A surrogate
renegotiation has in fact been taking place in the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (hereinafter MTN), also known as the Tokyo Round.
The MTN is a large trade negotiation being conducted under the
management of GATT. One of the subjects of negotiation has been
another code for the subject of countervailing duties. Countervailing
duties are in many ways a twin to antidumping duties, a compensa-
tory duty designed to counteract government subsidies. Both coun-
tervailing duties and antidumping duties are treated in GATT Article
VI, both being subjected to essentially the same rules. The MTN
code for countervailing duties has proved to be a virtual twin to the
Antidumping Code, covering most of the same subjects in virtually
the same language.
This time, however, there has been one important difference.
United States negotiators have come to the MTN negotiations with
the intention of submitting all such codes to congressional ratifica-
tion. Consequently, the United States has insisted on provisions that
Congress would in fact accept, particularly on issues such as causa-
tion and injury. At the same time, the United States has been willing
to consider asking for authority to adopt some of the Code's distinc-
tive procedures. Although negotiations are not complete at this writ-
ing, it appears that the final product will be a somewhat softened
version of the Antidumping Code rules, one that the United States
can enact into formal law.
If all this happens, it is more than likely that the next step will be a
renegotiation of the Antidumping Code itself, together with such con-
forming changes in United States legislation as are necessary.
NOTES
1. GATT is the General Agree- cle VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, Oc- ment on Tariffs and Trade,"
tober 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5)(6), (1967) 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S.
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. No. 6431, (effective July 1,
194 (effective Jan. 1, 1948), as 1968), Contracting Parties to
amended, T.I.A.S. No. 1890. the General Agreement on Tar-
The formal title of the Anti- iffs and Trade, BAsIC INSTRU-
dumping Code is: "Agreement 1ENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
on the Implementation of Arti- UMENTS (hereinafter cited as
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BISD), 15 Supp. 24 (1968). The
Code itself has been suscribed
to by only twenty-four parties.
See BISD, 23 Supp. 13 (1977)
(Eighth Report of the Com-
mittee on Antidumping Prac-
tices). Citations to the Code will
be given hereinafter as: "Anti-
dumping Code, Article __ ."
2. Even Professor Viner's cele-
brated treatise argues that an-
tidumping laws make eco-
nomic sense only in certain
limited areas. J. VINER, DUMP-
ING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE (1922). For a
much harsher economic cri-
tique of the antidumping laws
see Barcel6, The Antidumping
Law: Repeal It or Revise It,
ante.
3. In the course of this article,
reference is made to many po-
sitions taken by the United
States and other adherents to
the Code. Two points should be
made about these positions. (1)
The position taken at one or
two meetings is not necessarily
a permanent datum; no effort
has been made to discover
whether governments today
would take the same view on
each and every issue men-
tioned. (2) The public docu-
ments cited with regard to
such position statements will
verify their existence, but they
cannot report the positions
fully.
4. In other words, the central plan-
ner would also have to be con-
cerned about predatory dump-
ing and sporadic dumping.
5. Notwithstanding, both Hun-
gary and Poland have become
signatories of the Code. Hun-
gary has enacted the Code as
an internal antidumping law,
BISD, 23 Supp. 13, 15 (1977).
Poland has merely accepted
the Code obligations, but as yet
has no antidumping law of its
own.
6. The reasons for passing an anti-
dumping law in a state-con-
trolled economy are much like
the reasons for instituting a tar-
iff. So long as the economy in
question is committed to central
planning so that all trade is in
fact determined by purchasing
decisions, the law itself will be
meaningless. By passing the
law, however, the country in
question can then make a show
of accepting and obeying all in-
ternational obligations pertain-
ing thereto. While no one is
really fooled, or even meant to
be fooled, the scenario does pro-
vide a formalistic foundation for
a claim of good international
citizenship. There are usually
just enough signs of possible
movement toward a more mar-
ket-oriented economy-de-
clared intentions on the one
side, and wishful thinking on
the other-to blunt the edge of
cynicism that might occur in
these circumstances.
7. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53
(1976).
8. Title III of the 1974 Act is ti-
tled "Relief from Unfair Trade
Practices," and deals, inter
alia, with matters such as
dumping, export subsidies, and
various traditionally unfair
competitive practices such as
patent infringement. The rem-
edy provisions are found at 19
U.S.C. § 160 (dumping); 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (export sub-
sidies); 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (other
unfair trade practices).
9. It is rather difficult to see how
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antidumping measures could
have had much impact in the
quota-ridden Japanese market
of the 1960s. It remains to be
seen whether, despite the pro-
ceedings now under way, the
Japanese government will in
fact resort to the public con-
frontation of antidumping pro-
ceedings to deal with suspi-
ciously low-priced imports. See
Saxonhouse, Antidumping
Law in Japan, post.
10. For a description of the Commu-
nity's law, see Van Bael, The
E.E.C. Antidumping Rules-A
Practical Approach, 12 INT'L
LAw. 523 (1978). Another ex-
ample of verbatim adoption is
Hungary's law, see BISD, 22
Supp. 22 (1976).
11. See, e.g., BISD, 22 Supp. 25
(1976) (statement of United
States representative
summarized).
12. The Antidumping Code itselfcon-
tains no dispute resolution pro-
cedure; Article 17 provides for
nonadjudicatory consultations.
13. See BISD, 22 Supp. 25 (1976)
(summary of statement by
United States representative).
See also Rhem, The Kennedy
Round of Trade Negotiations,
62 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 430
(1968). The Executive branch
defense of the Code under the
Antidumping Act appears in
Hearings on the International
Antidumping Code before the
Senate Committee on Finance,
90th Cong. 2d Sess. 279-315
(1968) (hereinafter cited Sen-
ate Code Hearings).
14. Senate Code Hearings, supra
note 13, at 317-88 (Report of
the U.S. Tariff Comm'n to the
Sen. Comm. on Finance on S.
Con. Res. 38).
15. Renegotiation Amendments
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
634, tit. II, 82 Stat. 1347
(1968).
16. International trade subcommit-
tees in both Houses of Congress
have continued to investigate
problems of antidumping ad-
ministration. See, e.g., U.S.
General Accounting Office,
Doc. No. GGD-78-60 (April
1978) (GAO study responding to
six questions asked by Senators
Bayh, Heinz, Glenn, Metzen-
baum, and Randolph).
17. Due to space limitations, por-
tions of the original paper that
dealt with more technical sub-
jects such as price assurances
and other settlement practices
have been omitted.
18. GAO study, supra note 16, at
1: "The discussions did indi-
cate, however, that the initia-
tion of a dumping investigation
by Treasury creates enough
uncertainty in the market
place to prompt adjustments
either in the price of imports or
the quantity imported."
19. Antidumping Code, Article 4(a).
20. Treasury officials may refuse
to conduct even a preliminary
investigation unless facts relat-
ing to injury are alleged. See
19 C.F.R. §§ 153.29(a),
153.27(a)(4) (1977).
21. Antidumping Code, Article
5(a): "If in special circum-
stances the authorities con-
cerned decide to initiate an
investigation without having
received such a request, they
shall proceed only if they have
evidence both on dumping and
on injury resulting therefrom."
22. The complaint proceeding was
announced in 40 Fed. Reg.
33,755 (1975). The case was
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referred to the International
Trade Commission for a pre-
liminary investigation of injury;
the Commission held that the
case should not be dismissed.
New, On-the-Highway, Four-
Wheeled, Passenger Automo-
biles from Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and West
Germany, AA1921-Inq.-2,
USITC Publ. 739 (1975). The
case was settled and dismissed
without further proceedings.
23. The debate is reported in BISD,
22 Supp. 24-26 (1976).
24. See, e.g., text at notes 46-49,
infra. The Executive branch
analysis of the Code relies on
"normally" in this instance as
well. See Senate Code Hear-
ings, supra note 13, at 294.
25. One current case of govern-
ment-initiated complaints that
will probably be justified under
special circumstances, if ever
challenged, is the "fast-track"
procedure used under the so-
called Trigger-Price Mecha-
nism (hereinafter TPM) for
steel, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214
(1977). The special circum-
stance would presumably be
the recent history of steel
dumping cases, the crushing
volume of which forced the
adoption of the TPM.
26. It might be objected that the in-
dustry-initiation rule is merely a
way to assure the most reliable
proof of some injury. However,
the injury issue is taken care of
elsewhere. After stating the
rule of industry initiation, Arti-
cle 5(a) requires that the com-
plaint be "supported by evi-
dence both of dumping and of
injury resulting therefrom for
this industry."
27. Antidumping Code, Article
5(a).
28. The problem was that the Anti-
dumping Act vested determi-
nation of the injury issue in
the Tariff Commission, after
Treasury had completed its de-
termination of dumping. Trea-
sury sought to provide a very
minimal injury screening by
requiring that complaints con-
tain facts alleging injury under
what is claimed to be an inher-
ent power to dismiss frivolous
complaints that would waste
the taxpayers' money. For a
careful, somewhat tongue-in-
cheek description of Treasury's
contortions, see Anthony, The
American Response to Dump-
ing from Capitalist and So-
cialist Economies-Substan-
tive Premises and Restruc-
tured Procedures after the
1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL
L. REv. 159, 188-93 (1969).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(1) (1976).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (1976).
31. The sequence of events is
spelled out, backwards, in 19
U.S.C. § 160(a)-(c) (1976).
32. The primary target of the com-
plaints was the ITC's negative
finding in the auto case.
33. In the first few cases under the
special procedure a majority of
the Commissioners wrote care-
ful opinions stressing that the
new act required, before a dis-
missal, that the Commission
affirmatively find that there
was "no reasonable indication"
of injury-rather than merely
finding that injury is not
shown, not likely, or some
other failure-of-proof type con-




note 22, at 8-9 (Commissioner
Leonard), 16-17 (Commis-
sioners Bedell and Parker).
34. Treasury's power to revise its
determinations after a case is
sent to the ITC is claimed in
19 C.F.R. § 153.42 (1977).
35. The six cases were: Multimetal
Lithographic Plates from Mex-
ico, AA1921-Inq.-4, USITC
Publ. 775 (1976); Methyl Alco-
hol from Brazil, AA1921-Inq.-
7, USITC Publ. 837 (1977); Un-
coated Free Sheet Offset Paper
from Canada, AA1921-Inq.-10,
USITC Publ. 869 (1978); Photo-
graphic Color Paper from Japan
and West Germany, AA1921-
Inq.-11 and AA1921-Inq.-12,
USITC Publ. 885 (1978); Stan-
dard Household Incandescent
Lamps from Hungary, AA1921-
Inq.-18, USITC Publ. 912
(1978).
36. Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber
from Japan, AA1921-151,
USITC Publ. 764 (1976); Port-
land Hydraulic Cement from
Mexico, AA1921-161, USITC
Publ. 795 (1976).
37. Impression Fabric of Manmade
Fiber from Japan, AA1921-
176, USITC Publ. 872 (1978).
38. See the debate on the United
States automobile case, BISD,
22 Supp. 25 (1977).
39. The argument is reported in
GATr Doe. Coin AD/37, p. 40
(1976) (summary of statement
by United States representa-
tive).
40. See, e.g., Fisher, The Anti-
dumping Law of the United
States: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 85, 104-5 (1973).
41. The group of cases subject to
the new screening procedures
begins with Electric Golf Carts
from Poland, AA1921-147,
USITC Publ. 740 (1975), and
ends with Certain Nylon Yam
and Grouped Nylon Filaments
from France, AA1921-185,
USITC Publ. 922 (1978).
42. The sample is an extension of
Fisher's calculations, supra
note 40, and does not quite coin-
cide with the effective date of
the Code. The sample begins
with Cast Iron Soil Pipe from
Poland, AA1921-50, USTC
Publ. 214 (1967), and ends with
Lock-In Amplifiers and Parts
Thereof from the United King-
dom, AA1921-146, USITC
Publ. 736 (1975). There were
forty affirmative findings in the
seventy-six decisions involved.
43. See Fisher, supra note 40, at
104-5.
44. General economic conditions
are probably the most signifi-
cant influence on the ratios.
45. The debate is referred to in
BISD, 22 Supp. 24 (1976).
46. The concept of constructed
value itself is recognized in
GATT Article VI: 1(b)(ii), and
repeated in Antidumping Code,
Article 2(d).
47. Antidumping Code, Article
2(d).
48. 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1976).
49. Senate Code Hearings, supra
note 13, at 282-83.
50. 19 U.S.C. 165(b) (1976).
51. Antidumping Code, Article
2(d).
52. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
53. See Fisher, supra note 40, at
104-5; for detailed discussion
of the ITC treatment of the in-
jury standard, see Krauland,
The Standard of Injury in the
Resolution of Antidumping
Disputes, ante.
54. The case generally credited
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with announcing this narrower
test is Cast Iron Soil Pipe, su-
pra note 42. On the effects of
this doctrine, see Fisher, supra
note 40, at 104-6.
55. S. R I. No. 1298, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 180 (1974). The sec-
ond sentence obviously de-
serves some comment, but
what? Words fail to capture
the spirit of this remarkable
observation.
56. See Antidumping Code Articles
3(a)-(c).
57. The text of Article 3(a) does re-
quire authorities to weigh "on
the one hand, the effect of
dumping and, on the other
hand, all other factors taken
together which may be ad-
versely affecting the industry."
This looks like a "larger-than-
all-others-combined" test. For
a commentary on the Code test
and parallel United States de-
cisions, see Barcel6, Anti-
dumping Laws as Barriers to
Trade-the United States and
the International Antidump-
ing Code, 57 CORNELL L. REv.
491, 553-57 (1972).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
59. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong.,
24 Sess. 180 (1976): Moreover,
the law does not contemplate
that injury from LTFV imports
be weighed against other fac-
tors which may be contributing
to injury to an industry. The
words "by reason of" express a
causation link, but do not
mean that dumped imports
must be a (or the) principal
cause, a (or the) major cause,
or a (or the) substantial cause
of injury caused by all factors
contributing to overall injury
to an industry.
In short, the Committee does
not view injury caused by un-
fair competition, such as dump-
ing, to require as strong a cau-
sation link to imports as would
be required for determining the
existence of injury under fair
trade conditions.
60. The quotation in the previous
footnote seems to straddle
these two views. In Commis-
sion opinions, one occasionally
sees a reference to "the injury"
caused by dumped imports,
e.g., Portland Hydraulic Ce-
ment from Mexico, AA1921-
161, USITC Publ. 795 (1976),
at 3 n.1, but the more common
way of expressing the analysis
is to talk about the need for
some partial contribution to
overall injury, e.g., Birch
Three-Ply Door Skins from Ja-
pan, AA1921-150, USITC
Publ. 754 (1976), at 10 ("...
one must be able to identify
the injury as resulting at least
in part from the LTFV sales.").
61. See Trade Expansion Act of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, §
301(b)(3), 76 Stat. 872 (1962);
Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1)-
(4), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1)-(4)
(1976).
62. The "fair-unfair" distinction
affects the entire structure of
escape-clause and antidump-
ing remedies. See also note 59,
supra.
63. Antidumping Code, Article
4(a).
64. The term "industry" is not de-
fined, but the ITC has long in-
terpreted the term as referring
to national production, ab in-
itio. See, e.g., the Tariff Com-
mission's report on the compat-
ibility of the Antidumping
Code and United States law,
Senate Code Hearings, supra
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note 13, at 337-42. For a de-
tailed discussion of the ITC's
efforts to define "industry," see
Krauland, The Standard of In-
jury in the Resolution of Anti-
dumping Disputes, supra, text
accompanying notes 2-24.
65. In Code Articles 3(d) and 4(a),
an effort is made to define the
industry in terms of the nar-
rowest possible product de-
scription. This is a puzzling re-
quirement, in that it makes
any given volume of imports
appear to be a proportionally
larger share of the domestic
market than would be true if
broader product definitions
were used. Although the United
States practice looks in theory
to any industry that might be
injured, it is unlikely that the
difference would ever result in
an affirmative finding that
could not be justified under the
narrower Code test.
66. Senate Code Hearings, supra
note 13, at 337-42. Perhaps
the sharpest contrast would be
found in Chromic Acid from
Australia, AA1921-32, USTC
Publ. 121 (1964), in which
none of the United States pro-
ducers is located in the sector
identified as a regional market.
One may wonder whether the
analysis used in this case-a
sort of businessman's idea of
different markets based on
some degree of price isola-
tion-would be followed today.
More recent discussions of the
concept appear sensitive to the
need for at least some degree
of isolation of sales and pro-
duction. See Portland Hydrau-
lic Cement from Canada,
AA1921-184, USITC Publ.
918 (1978).
67. Steel Bars, Reinforcing Bars,
and Shapes from Australia,
AA1921-62, USTC Publ. 314
(1970), at 4. The doctrine was
actually developed in a pair of
1964 decisions involving Cana-
dian imports into the Oregon-
Washington area. Steel Rein-
forcing Bars from Canada,
AA1921-33, USTC Publ. 122
(1964); Carbon Steel Bars and
Shapes from Canada, AA1921-
39, USTC Publ. 135 (1964).
68. In two recent "thirty-day won-
der" proceedings under section
160(c), the Commission did
rely on the possibility of a re-
gional industry analysis as one
of the reasons why the finding
of injury could not be excluded
on the basis of available injury
data. Perchloroethylene from
Belgium, France and Italy,
AA1921-Inq.-14, -15, -16,
USITC Publ. 904 (1978); Su-
gar from Belgium, France and
West Germany, AA1921-Inq.-
20, -21, -22, USITC Publ. 916
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